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Abstract
This paper examines how a decisionmaker who is only partially aware of his tempta-
tions learns about them over time. In facing temptations over time, individuals use their
experiences to forecast future self-control problems and choose the appropriate level of com-
mitment. I demonstrate that rational learning can be perpetually partial and need not result
in full sophistication. The main result of this paper characterizes necessary and sucient
conditions for learning to converge to full sophistication. This result has implications for
commonly studied self-control environments such as savings and addiction.
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1\An individual who nds himself continuously repudiating his past plans may
learn to distrust his future behavior, and may do something about it."
| Strotz (1955)
1 Introduction
Questions of temptation and costly self-control are at the forefront of psychology and economics.
An important choice in analyzing self-control is in deciding how aware a decisionmaker is of
his temptations since dierent assumptions of self-awareness naturally translate into dierent
behavioral predictions. The assumption most commonly made, referred to as sophistication, is
that the decisionmaker perfectly anticipates future self-control problems. Yet, sophistication
is often seen as an inaccurate model of a decisionmaker's awareness, especially in the short-
and medium-run when the decisionmaker may be inexperienced. An alternative assumption is
that of naivete, whereby a decisionmaker anticipates having perfect self-control in the feature.
Bridging the gap between these two extreme assumptions, O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001) pro-
pose a framework of partial naivete in which a decisionmaker with (;) preferences assigns
probability 1 to a particular level of present bias (^ ) more moderate than his true present-bias
(^  > ).
With a few exceptions, most models of study imperfect self-control make one of the above
assumptions. That derived behavior is sensitive to the specication of beliefs has been widely
recognized, including by those that rst modeled self-control (Strotz, 1955; Pollak, 1968). Nev-
ertheless, the practice has been to treat a decisionmaker's belief about his self-control as ex-
ogenous and derive dynamic choice given that exogenous belief. While this practice makes
analysis tractable, it raises two conceptual issues. First, in models of partial sophistication, a
decisionmaker's beliefs may be incompatible with what is observed over time, and so ancillary
assumptions are necessary for analysis.1 Second, given the many dierent awareness assump-
tions that could be made, it has been dicult to assess which assumption is appropriate for
a particular environment and why. Fudenberg (2006), in his recent discussion of behavioral
economics, voices this concern.
\I think that behavioral economics would be well served by concerted attempts to
provide learning-theoretic (or any other foundations) for its equilibrium concepts.
At the least, this process might provide a better understanding of when the currently
used concepts apply...."
This paper proposes a simple framework to address these concerns. In this approach, beliefs
and choices are derived endogenously and jointly evolve based on the decisionmaker's experi-
ence. Endogenizing beliefs in this way allows one to pose and answer the question of whether
1For example, a partially naive decisionmaker may see behavior that contradicts his view of the world in each
and every period. The literature typically addresses this issue by assuming that the DM's beliefs are not revised,
which implicitly assumes that the DM does not receive feedback about payos or the past history.
2and when sophistication closely approximates the decisionmaker's self-awareness once he has
had many opportunities to learn. Although one may tempted to conclude that learning should
always engender sophistication, I demonstrate that tradeos between commitment and exibil-
ity inherent in self-control environments may actually impede learning. The main result of this
paper is to oer a necessary and sucient condition|across self-control environments|under
which such possibilities arise, and derive when instead, learning inexorably leads to sophisti-
cation. This condition can be easily checked in applications to assess the appropriateness of
sophistication in an environment, and as such, these results have implications for how we should
think about self-awareness in dierent settings.
As one application of this approach, I analyze a standard buer-stock consumption-savings
environment in which a decisionmaker has a temptation to overconsume in each period and
can commit by purchasing illiquid assets. This setting has been the focus of many papers in
the quasi-hyperbolic literature (e.g. Laibson, 1997; Barro, 1999), almost all of which assume
sophistication. I demonstrate that this canonical environment satises the condition for so-
phistication: thus, a decisionmaker who learns about his tendency to overconsume from his
past choices eventually chooses commitment as if he could perfectly forecast his temptation
to overconsume. This learning-theoretic justication for focusing on sophistication in savings
environments tells us that in this important setting, sophistication emerges naturally from
experience.
In contrast to this, I also demonstrate that the condition for sophistication may fail in
standard applications. Building on the seminal contribution of Bernheim and Rangel (2004),
I analyze the behavior of a decisionmaker who learns about how easily he becomes addicted.
I demonstrate that such a decisionmaker can make long-run choices that depart from how a
sophisticated individual would make choices, and that this analysis can provide insight into why
certain interventions|such as temporary subsidies to drug rehabilitation|have long-lasting
implications on rehabilitation.
The general framework that I develop builds on the Planner-Doer approach to self-control:
decisions are made through the conjunction of a single long-run Planner (with dynamically
consistent preferences) and a myopic Doer who is a short-run player or behavioral type. Prior
research using such models, particularly Fudenberg and Levine (2006), has demonstrated that
such models oer analytically simple and tractable frameworks to understand self-control in
a variety of settings,2 and this paper illustrates how this approach can be used to address
questions of awareness. The Planner represents the forward-looking rational individual that
chooses how much to commit by investing in illiquid assets, signing contracts etc. In contrast,
the Doer represents the instinctive response of the individual that makes the daily choices,
and is presented with stimuli, situations, and choices; as such, the Doer should be thought of
2Thaler and Shefrin (1981) were the rst to propose dual-self models to model imperfect self-control. There
have been a number of other recent papers|Benabou and Pycia (2002), Bernheim and Rangel (2004), Benhabib
and Bisin (2005), Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2007), Brocas and Carrillo (2008)|that use dual-self models.
Dekel and Lipman (2007), Chatterjee and Krishna (2009), and Ambrus and Rozen (2009) oer axiomatizations
of dual-self models.
3as a short-run player or behavioral type. While the behavior of the Doer may be cultivated
through good habits, the Planner may be uncertain about the extent to which the Doer resists
temptation, and attempts to extract this information from the Doer's behavior.
To x ideas, I describe the example explored in Section 2: suppose that an individual faces
a choice between eating sh and steak in each period. In the beginning of the period, the
Planner makes a reservation either at a restaurant that features simply sh and the other that
features both sh and steak. The payo from eating sh is constant over time and across the
two restaurants, but that from eating steak depends on an i.i.d. taste shock that is realized
after the Planner selects the menu. Eating sh is ex ante optimal, but there are contingencies
in which steak may be preferred. As in Kreps (1979), the Planner would strictly prefer the
exibility associated with the larger menu were self-control not an issue; however, once the
decisionmaker is at the restaurant, the choice of what to eat (if there is a choice) is made by
the Doer. The Doer's preferences are partially aligned with that of the Planner, and partially
reect a temptation to eat steak in contingencies in which the Planner prefers sh (because of
its associated long-term benets). The Planner is uncertain about the strength of the Doer's
temptation and would benet from learning it over time since that helps him plan in the
future. Were the decisionmaker to know that in the restaurant, he could resist temptation, he
may strictly prefer the larger menu to utilize his informational advantage. In contrast, if he
believes that he would be too easily tempted by the opportunity to eat steak, the decisionmaker
may nd it ex ante optimal to select the smaller menu, which oers commitment value.
Learning about one's ability to resist temptation involves costly experimentation (and, in
this case, is isomorphic to a two-armed bandit): the Planner observes the Doer's self-control only
when the Planner chooses the larger menu and exposes the Doer to temptation. Accordingly,
once the Planner becomes suciently pessimistic about the Doer's type, he chooses the smaller
menu since the value of exibility and learning no longer outweigh the expected sacrice of the
Doer succumbing to temptation. Notably, the Planner may make this decision with positive
probability even when the Doer is a \good type" who resists temptation. The Planner can
therefore choose to remain perpetually biased even when given innite possibilities to learn.
The direction of the skewness in these beliefs merits discussion. The Planner cannot perpet-
ually overestimate the Doer's self-control and undercommit relative to how he would choose in
the full information benchmark. To see why, notice that any belief that rationalizes exibility
will allow the Planner to continue to passively learn and therefore update his beliefs. Thus,
if the Doer is unable to resist temptation, the Planner almost-surely learns this over time,
and eventually makes the same commitment choice that he would in the complete-information
benchmark. While such optimism necessarily erodes over time and is not sustainable in the
long-run, it may be present in the short and medium-run especially if the Planner begins with
a prior that greatly overestimates the Doer's ability to resist temptation.
On the other hand, the Planner may perpetually underestimate the Doer's self-control even
if he began with an overoptimistic prior: once the Planner has observed the Doer capitulating
4to temptation too often, exibility appears too costly in the short-term, and a Planner will
choose to actively learn for as long as the future value of learning outweighs its cost. So long
as the Planner is not perfectly patient, he is willing to undertake a nite number of trials after
which he may commit to the singleton menu and never revise his belief thereafter. Thus, partial
awareness and learning can endogenously lead to perpetual overregulation whereby individuals
choose rigid commitments or lifestyles that they would not were they more self-aware.
A feature of the setting described above is that the Planner chooses between full exibility
or full commitment (through singleton menus), but has no ability to partially commit. In
contrast, many settings feature a variety of partial commitments that retain some exibility
for the decisionmaker while providing a measure of commitment. For example, in the savings
environment, an individual can purchase illiquid assets to ensure some minimal savings without
relinquishing exibility altogether. Contractual mechanisms, such as recent innovations like
stickK.com,3 can penalize certain choices and provide incentives to counteract temptation while
retaining some exibility. Social mechanisms|through promises, shame, and peer groups|also
provide partial commitment insofar as they change the benets and costs of particular actions,
but are not completely binding. Apart from external partial commitments, a decisionmaker
may also rely on internal commitments, such as costly self-control (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001;
Fudenberg and Levine, 2006), which inuence the choice from a menu without relinquishing
exibility altogether. Apart from the static benet of intermediate commitment, the framework
here demonstrates that these partial commitments play a role in the decisionmaker's long-run
behavior and beliefs.
The main result of this paper identies exactly when partial commitments induce ecient
learning regardless of the Planner's patience. The necessary and sucient condition for such
learning to emerge, Full Commitment Monotonicity (FCM), is a condition on how fully in-
formed Planners behave, and relates to the richness of the set of partial commitments. In
application, this condition can be assessed through either the modeler's understanding of the
environment or carefully designed choice experiments. The condition naturally translates into
a monotonicity condition, which may or may not be satised depending upon the range of com-
mitment technologies. As mentioned above, I explore the implication of these results in three
dierent settings that have been studied in prior work assuming sophistication: consumption-
savings with illiquid assets, addiction with cue-triggered compulsions, and a costly self-control
environment. Within these settings, I illustrate how to check the validity of FCM, and derive
the implications within that theory.
The results of this paper underscore the insights that emerge from deriving the decision-
maker's understanding of his temptations from his environment. Based on these results, one
may expect that in settings that feature a wide range of partial commitments, people may know
more about their temptations than in settings in which partial commitments are less eective.
From a normative perspective, this role of partial commitments has implications for the design
3StickK.com is a recent contractual innovation designed to \...help people achieve their goals and objectives
by enabling them to form Commitment Contracts." (http://www.stickk.com/about.php).
5and pricing of commitment. Prior work that assumes a particular belief for a decisionmaker and
derives dynamic choices holding that belief xed is silent on how beliefs and choices evolve over
time and vary by setting, and from that perspective, this study generates a new perspective on
self-control and self-awareness.
Some readers may be troubled by the disappearance of overoptimism at the limits of
Bayesian learning, although to my knowledge, there is no evidence to suggest that people per-
sistently undercommit. While I use the approach developed here to study asymptotic behavior,
the framework is suciently exible and tractable to model a decisionmaker's initial response
and these initial responses may reect initial optimism. Indeed, there are numerous reasons
to believe that decisionmakers should begin with optimistic priors and learn slowly,4 and so
ndings in the eld may be consistent with short- and medium-run behavior. Moreover, to the
extent that decisionmakers often have to simultaneously learn about their self-control and the
benets or costs of dierent actions, one should expect learning in a multidimensional environ-
ment to be particularly slow. Indeed, I show through example that such environments present
an identication challenge that impedes learning severely and cause a decisionmaker to under-
commit relative to a full information benchmark. As such, there are natural reasons to expect
learning to be slow in certain settings, as in health, when the decisionmaker is simultaneously
learning about self-control and the benets and costs of actions.
Section 2 provides a simple example of the impediment to learning introduced by imperfect
self-control; the example reduces to a standard two-armed bandit. Section 3 considers a richer
model with partial commitments, in which experimentation takes a more general form. In that
section, I derive the main characterization of this paper. Section 4 applies the framework to
savings behavior, addiction, and the possibility for costly self-control. Section 5 discusses the
results of this paper in light of the related literature and oers the example of the identication
challenged induced by multidimensional learning. The Appendix contains all proofs.
2 A Simple Example
To illustrate the mechanism for incomplete learning in the most transparent way, I analyze a
simple example. Consider an innitely-lived individual who chooses between undertaking an
activity (at = 1) or not (at =  1) in each period t in f0;1;2;3;:::g. Undertaking the activity in




but involves a stochastic cost ct uniformly
drawn from [0;1]. This activity can represent, for example, the choice to consume sh from the
example described in the introduction or to exercise, in which case b captures the discounted
long-run gain from the activity.
The decision in each period is made through the conjunction of two systems, the Planner
and the Doer, who act sequentially in each period. The Planner is a long-run agent with an
4Optimism could emanate from a number of dierent sources, if a positive belief about one's attributes
has some intrinsic value (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005; K} oszegi, 2006; Dal Bo and Tervio, 2008) or induces
motivation (Benabou and Tirole, 2002; Compte and Postlewaite, 2004).
6exponential discount factor  2 (0;1), and obtains (b   ct) if at = 1 and 0 otherwise. In the 1st
sub-period of each period t, the Planner is forced to make a commitment choice prior to the
realization of ct. He chooses between full commitment to undertaking the activity (zt = 1), full
commitment to not undertaking the activity (zt =  1), and exibility (zt = 0) which delegates
the decision to the Doer who acts in the 2nd sub-period. When the Planner chooses to commit
to an action, the action is undertaken regardless of the Doer's type or the realized cost; one way
to interpret such commitments is that the Planner chooses a singleton menu that constrains
the subsequent choice entirely.
The Doer in each period is not a strategic actor but can be thought of as a behavioral type




where 0   <    1,
at the beginning of the game and this type persists throughout the game. When the Planner
is exible, the Doer of type  observes ct and chooses at = 1 if and only if b exceeds ct. Thus,
the Doer is tempted towards inactivity, and undertakes the activity in fewer contingencies than
the Planner would wish to do so. This temptation may emerge from a manifestation of a
present-bias when costs and rewards are temporally separated. The perspective here is that
the Doer being myopic (representing the individual's instincts) does not account for how its
choices inuence the Planner's decisions.
The Planner faces a tradeo between commitment and exibility: while he would like to
trust the Doer's informational advantage, exibility opens the door for temptations to guide
that choice. Since the payo from exibility depends on the Doer's susceptibility to temptation,
it is potentially valuable for the Planner to try to learn about  so as to make the right decision
in the future. I assume that the Planner would prefer to commit to undertaking the activity if
he were perfectly condent that  =  and would prefer to remain exible if he were condent
that  =  .5
He begins with a prior 0 = Pr
 
 =  

that ascribes positive probability to both types.
For purposes of simplicity, suppose that all that he observes over time is behavior and not
past realizations of costs (I consider more general informational structures in Section 3). Since
full commitments override the Doer, the Planner learns about  only when he chooses to be
exible. I use ht to summarize the relevant history for the Planner when acting at time t, and
t to denote the Planner's posterior belief that the Doer's type is  . Given a prior belief ,
the Planner updates his beliefs to + and   when he is exible and observes the Doer choose
at = 1 and at =  1 respectively. The dynamic decision problem of the Planner is described by
the value function
V () = max
(
b   E [c] + V ();
P
2f; g Pr ()(b(b   E [cjc  b] + V (+)) + (1   b)V ( ))
)
; (1)
where the 1st term is the value of committing to undertake the action, and the 2nd term is







; when this does not hold, the Planner's optimal commitment choice
is independent of his belief about the Doer's type.
7the value of exibility. The Planner never commits to a =  1 since ex ante, this is dominated
by committing to a = 1. Standard arguments ensure that the value function exists, is unique,
continuity, and non-decreasing in , and thus, the optimal decision takes the form of a simple
threshold rule:
Proposition 1. There exists  2 (0;1) such that for all  < , the Planner's optimal choice
is to commit to the activity and for   , the Planner's optimal choice is exibility.
When the Planner is more optimistic about the Doer's ability to resist temptation or values
the option to learn, he is more willing to remain exible. Because of the option-value associated
with exibility and learning, a forward-looking Planner is willing to choose exibility even if
he expects that committing yields greater short-run payos. For less optimistic beliefs, when
 < , the benets of exibility and learning do not oset the expected costs of temptation
and therefore the Planner chooses to commit. Since the choice of commitment shuts down the
channel for learning, once he chooses to commit in one period, he nds it optimal to commit
in every subsequent period. Because the choice to commit is endogenous, eventual beliefs are
endogenous, and therefore evolve dierently for each type of the Doer (assuming that the prior
0 exceeds ).
Consider the case in which the Doer is of type . The Planner's beliefs will uctuate so
long as he remains exible and his beliefs remain bounded away from putting probability 1 on
 . The Martingale Convergence Theorem ensures that the Planner's beliefs must eventually
settle down but that convergence to the completely incorrect belief of  = 1 does not happen.
Therefore, the Planner must eventually commit, making the same choice that he would in
the complete-information benchmark; initial partial awareness does not forge any long-lasting
dierences from the standard benchmark.
Now suppose that the Doer is of type  . In this case as well, the Martingale Convergence
Theorem implies eventual convergence of the Planner's beliefs. Convergence obtains in two
distinct ways: either the Planner's beliefs converge to the truth (t ! 1) or the Planner's belief
t falls below , leading him to commit. Both events occur with positive probability. Recall
that in the complete-information environment, a Planner who knew that his self-control problem
is   would never choose to commit. Thus, relative to this benchmark, partial awareness and
learning introduce a possibility for long-run ineciency and overcommitment. The preceding
ideas are summarized below.




, a Planner eventually chooses to commit with strictly
positive probability.
1. If the Doer is of type , then almost-surely, the Planner eventually chooses to commit.
2. If the Doer is of type  , then the Planner either chooses to commit or he learns the Doer's
type. Both events occur with strictly positive probability if 0  .
8This result illustrates how any beliefs that induce excessive exibility eventually vanish: if
the Doer is of type , any belief of the Planner that rationalizes exibility is rened over time
as the Planner naturally infers the Doer's type from its choices. Almost-surely, this information
leads the Planner to conclude that the Doer's type does not warrant exibility, and therefore,
the Planner eventually chooses to commit. While overoptimism disappears eventually, it may
persist in the short and medium-run, especially if individuals begin with such priors.
What is the source for the friction from underestimating self-control? The principal chal-
lenge that the Planner faces is that when he optimally chooses to commit (believing that he
faces a Doer of type ), his commitment choice leaves no opportunity for him to distinguish
between dierent types. Partial commitments oer an opportunity for him to escape this ex-
perimentation trap, as I explore below.
For simplicity, suppose that the individual has risk-neutral and additive preferences, and
consider a one-period bond contract in which the Planner pays a lump-sum amount L and a
prize x is returned to the decisionmaker in the event that the Doer chooses a = 1. There are
various ways in which one could model how such a contract aects the Doer; for simplicity,
suppose that a Doer of type  chooses to take the action if b + x exceeds the cost c. In this
case, a fully informed Planner regardless of the Doer's type can implement the rst-best by
setting x to equal (1   )b, and paying a prior lump-sum amount of (1   )b2. This bond
contract leads to zero expected transfers and induces the Doer to choose a = 1 whenever the
Planner would like to do so.
Not only does such a bond contract allow a fully informed Planner to achieve rst-best, but
it also helps a partially aware Planner learn eciently. Through such a contract, regardless
of the Planner' beliefs, it is now never optimal to restrict the Doer's choice set. Even when
the Planner becomes quite condent that the Doer's type is , he is better o with a bond
contract that retains exibility. Over time, the Planner is able to observe the Doer's behavior
and therefore continue learning; almost-surely, his beliefs converge to the truth.
The possibility for partial commitments to dynamically improve learning has implications for
commitment design. Recent years have seen the advent and study of commitment contracts that
incentivize good behavior and mitigate self-control problems.6 The following section analyzes
more generally when partial commitments lead to ecient learning. The reader particularly
interested in the application of these results can skip to Section 4 in which I highlight the
implications of partial commitments (and their absence) in canonical self-control environments.
3 When is Learning Adequate?
The general model developed in this section builds on the above example in three ways. First,
the Doer's type is drawn from a continuum. Second, the Planner has a range of commitment
6Internet-based services such as stickK.com permit an individual to sign a contract (specifying a monitor)
that involves penalties if a particular target is not met. Gin e et al. (2009) nd that a bond commitment contract
helps smokers cope with their addiction.
9technologies that may include partial commitment options. Third, the Planner observes signals
about past taste shocks.
The timing of the game is unchanged. The Planner has a stage-payo function in which
at =  1 leads to a payo of 0 and at = 1 leads to a payo of ut. This payo, ut, is drawn from
U  [u;  u] where u < 0 <  u, distributed i.i.d. with cdf F () that has a continuous and strictly
positive density and a strictly positive expectation. The Planner cannot directly choose actions
but chooses commitment from a range of commitment choices zt in Z, a closed subset of [ 1;1]
that contains f 1;0;1g. Z is a parameter of the model, representing a range of commitments
or ability to exert self-control. My analysis in this section focuses on how dierent assumptions
on Z translate into the potential for full-learning. Varying the commitment level z within Z
aects the actions of the Doer: zt 2 f 1;0;1g correspond to the full commitment and full
exibility choices from the simple example, while intermediate choices may induce the Doer to
take particular actions in some but not all contingencies, as described below.
As before, the Doer is a myopic agent that does not account for how its actions aect
the Planner's choices. The Doer's behavior is governed by its type  drawn from  = [l;h]
according to measure 0 that has a continuous and strictly positive density on . The Doer
observes the taste shock ut, and chooses at = 1 if W (ut;;z) is non-negative and at = 0
otherwise. The payo function W is continuous and strictly increasing in each argument. Under
full exibility (z = 0), a Doer of type l never undertakes the activity while type h always
undertakes the activity. Observe that this formulation permits uncertainty about the direction
of temptation.7 Full commitments override the choices of the Doer insofar as they determine the
eventual action regardless of the taste shock and type: for all u, W (u;l;1)  0 > W (u;h; 1);
I interpret such full commitments as the choice of a singleton menu. A special case that
the reader can keep in mind as a convenient example is W (u;;z) = u + 2 + 4z, in which
 = U = [ 0:5;0:5]. I denote a full information environment   = (U;F;W;) as a constellation
of parameters that satisfy the above conditions.
After each period t, the Planner observes at (knowing his own choice zt) and obtains
some information about ut. The setting of Section 2 considered an extreme case where the
Planner learns nothing about ut; one could equally consider the other extreme in which the
Planner always observes ut. Spanning these two extremes, one could analyze an intermedi-
ate environment|imperfect attribution|in which the Planner observes ut with noise. More
generally, suppose that the Planner does not observe ut but obtains a signal yt (at;ut) that
comes from a space Y = U, and is distributed according to ~ F (yju;a).8 For t > 0, ht =
((z0;a0;y0);:::;(zt 1;at 1;yt 1)) denotes the relevant history for the Planner in period t, and
t denotes the posterior beliefs of  conditional on history ht.
For much of the paper, I make the following assumption on observability.
7That temptation can exist in either direction is consistent with evidence from Kivetz and Simonson (2002)
and Ameriks et al. (2007).
8Other papers within the Bayesian learning paradigm that consider coarse observation functions include
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994), Dekel et al. (2004), and Esponda (2008).
10Assumption 1. ~ F (yju;a) has full support on Y and has a density that is strictly positive and
jointly continuous in (u;y).
Assumption 1 simplies the analysis although it is not necessary: it ensures that the support
of signals is independent of the Doer's type, and therefore, a single signal cannot be perfectly
revealing. The assumption plays a role in the clean characterization of when partial learning
emerges in Theorem 2. Apart from its technical role, there are substantive reasons to be
interested in imperfect attribution, as detailed in this footnote.9 In Section 3.4.2, I illustrate
what happens when Assumption 1 fails and instead, ut is fully observable ex post. The main
result holds in the absence of Assumption 1, but the characterization and proof are more
intricate.
Before proceeding with the analysis, I make a number of remarks about the model.
Partial Commitment. I model a Planner's ability to partially commit as his inuence over
how the Doer behaves for each taste-shock. An interpretation of this commitment is that the
Planner can use obstacles/instruments that nudge the Doer in a particular direction by making
it more costly to take a particular action. These instruments include nancial commitment con-
tracts (like those oered by stickK.com), self-rationing,10 the role of peer groups and promises,11
and costly self-control. Partial commitment may also correspond to a habit-formation process
whereby the Planner changes the Doer's preferences through the management of cues. Since the
ecacy of any particular \therapy" is learned only through experience, the Planner necessarily
engages in experimentation.
A dierent formulation for partial commitment is one in which actions come from a rich set,
the Planner chooses a strict but non-singleton subset of actions, and the Doer makes choices
from that smaller menu. While a general treatment of this setting is left for future research,
I explore an application in this spirit in Section 4.1 when I study a canonical consumption-
savings decisions in which the Doer chooses actions from a continuum and the Planner sets an
upper-bound on possible consumption.
Relationship with Example. The model of Section 2 is a special case in which ut = b   ct,




, and W (u;;z) = u   (1   )b + z, where z 2 Z = f 1;0;1g in
9First, instead of observing the taste shock directly, the Doer may observe merely a noisy signal of it; equivalent
results emerge in an imperfect monitoring model in which the Doer obtains a noisy signal of ut, and the Planner
observes ut but not the signal of the Doer. Second, to the extent that past circumstances and taste shocks are
representations of subjective states and emotions, it may be dicult for the Planner to obtain perfect information
about past circumstances. Various studies highlight the diculties individuals face in recalling past feelings and
motives, and in separating situational factors from one's innate character. Baumeister et al. (1994) argue for the
need for an individual to track her actions to minimize attribution errors, and Ameriks et al. (2003) describe
it as a \skill," tracing its impact on wealth accumulation. Moreover, if taste-shocks are meant to encapsulate
hedonic states, Kahneman et al. (1997) describe the diculty individuals face in recall.
For these reasons, imperfect attribution has also been studied in related work, where the assumption is that a
decisionmaker learns about his self-control using a \revealed preference" approach (Benabou and Tirole, 2004;
Battaglini et al., 2005; Dal Bo and Tervio, 2008).
10See Wertenbroch (2003) for a discussion of the evidence on self-rationing, whereby individuals choose to not
stock tempting objects so as to make their more expensive to obtain.
11See Battaglini et al. (2005) and Carrillo and Dewatripont (2008).
11the absence of a bond contract, or Z = [ 1;1] when there is a continuum of bond contracts to
incentivize actions.
Bandit Structure. Since Z is any closed subset of [ 1;1]{including intervals, discontinuities,
and isolated points|the Planner faces an experimentation environment similar to but richer
than a standard multi-armed bandit. Accordingly, while I use insights from the bandit /
experimentation framework, these results are distinct from those derived in prior work.
3.1 Adequate Vs. Partial Learning
The central issue analyzed is whether the Planner eventually attains the same payos that he
would in the complete-information benchmark where the Doer's type is known. The complete-




corresponds to the static payos from commitment choice z when the Doer's type is . Denote
the complete-information payo when the Doer is of type  by  () = maxz2Z  (;z) and let
z () be the smallest of the maximizers of  (;z). This payo corresponds to the Planner's
optimal balance between exibility and commitment when the Planner is certain about the
Doer's type.
When the Planner is uncertain about  and has beliefs , he optimizes with respect to
his beliefs. Denote the payo in a single period from a commitment choice z by m(;z) =
R
  (;z)d; however, when the Planner is even slightly patient, he also values learning. Given
a commitment choice z and prior , the Planner may revise his beliefs when observing the Doer
undertake action a and signal y; Q(;z) denotes the probability distribution over posteriors
induced by (;z), and P () denotes the set of Borel probability measures on . The Planner
solves the Bellman Equation,









Conditional on a true , the Planner's beliefs, commitment choices, and therefore, value
function evolve stochastically; the object of interest is their long-run distribution. We can par-
tition the set of types into those for which learning is fully ecient, yielding the full information
payos, from those for which learning may entail some long-run ineciencies.
Denition 1. Learning is adequate for a type  if the Planner's payos when uncertain





V (t;) =  ()j

= 1,
and otherwise, learning is partial for type . Learning is globally adequate if the set of types
for which learning is partial, 
P, has 0-measure 0, and otherwise, learning is inadequate.
Adequate learning is weaker than complete learning insofar as the eventual belief need not
identify the type but the Planner nevertheless obtains the same payos as in the complete
12information benchmark. Globally adequate learning requires more than the mere existence of
a strategy that ensures learning; indeed, it must be that such a strategy is optimal.
3.2 Distinguishability and Full Commitment Monotonicity
The possibility for globally adequate learning relies critically on the commitment set Z, and
one can assess if Z is conducive to learning by examining how a fully informed Planner be-
haves. Before deriving the precise condition, I provide a heuristic explanation. For learning
to be globally adequate, it must be the case that learning is free since were it costly at all, a
Planner may stop learning once he is suciently condent. Since learning obtains whenever a
Planner endows the Doer with partial exibility (the empirical frequency of the Doer's choices
identify its type), it is only when he chooses to completely constrain the Doer that learning is
impeded. Therefore, for adequate learning to emerge, it is necessary that whenever the Planner
chooses commitment levels z that force particular types  to always choose a = 1, he can still
distinguish it from those types for which he would wish to retain exibility.12 This property of
distinguishability is fundamental to the possibility for globally adequate learning. Indeed, the
consequence of its failure is apparent in Section 2 in which committing the weak type () to
select a = 1 precludes the strong type
  

from having any exibility.
In the setting here, and in applications explored in Section 4, distinguishability naturally
translates into a monotonicity condition. Since any commitment choice that forces a particular
type to choose a = 1 also forces every higher type, adequate learning then fails whenever the
Planner would prefer to provide exibility to a high type but force a lower type to choose
a = 1. To describe the condition precisely, let  z () = minfz 2 Z : W (u;;z)  0g denote the
minimal level of commitment necessary to make type  always undertake the action. The set
^  = f 2  : z () =  z ()g contains those Doer types that a fully informed Planner forces to
choose a = 1 regardless of the taste-shock.
Denition 2. The set of partial commitments, Z, satises Condition FCM (Full-Commitment
Monotonicity) for an environment   if  2 ^  implies that for all 0 > , 0 2 ^ .
Under FCM, the set of types for which the Planner chooses to provide the Doer with no
exibility must be an interval of the form [;h] if it is non-empty. A sucient but not necessary
condition for FCM is that a fully informed Planner never forces a type to always choose a = 1.
A commitment set fails FCM for  if a fully informed Planner would wish to fully commit for
some type but remain exible for a higher type. Since the Planner's preference for commitment
is dened by how the Doer maps taste-shocks into actions, whether an environment satises
FCM is invariant to the representation of the Doer's preferences.13
12Since u has a strictly positive expectation, the Planner always prefers forcing the Doer to take a = 1 rather
than forcing it to choose a =  1:





0) to be equivalent if (U;F) =
(U
0;F
0) and there exists an isomorphism  :  ! 
0 such that W (u;;z)  0 if and only if W
0 (u;();z)  0.
Then it is straightforward to show that   satises FCM if and only if  
0 satises FCM.
13Section 2 highlights this contrast: the basic commitment set fails FCM since committing
type  entails providing no exibility to type  . On the other hand, once the bond commitment
contract is introduced, the environment satises FCM since in that case, ^  is empty.
FCM is distinct from standard notions of richness insofar as a commitment set may fail
FCM while a strict subset satises it. The following examples illustrate this aspect of FCM:







Example 1 (FCM with no commitment). Suppose Z = [ 1;1]: then a fully informed Planner
can set z () =  
2 to align every type's preference perfectly while retaining exibility for each
type. Thus, ^  = ; and FCM is trivially satised.
Example 2 (FCM with commitment). Suppose Z = f 1g[[0;1]: then a fully informed Planner





. Observe that for any type  above 1
4, this choice of commitment





. In this case, ^  is non-empty
but nevertheless satises FCM.






added to the previous Z: then the fully informed Planner would set z  1
4

= 0 to force a Doer




4 providing exibility to type 1
2.
3.3 Main Results
The following result states the connection between FCM and learning.
Theorem 2.
1. If the set of partial commitments satises FCM for  , then for every , learning is globally
adequate.
2. If the set of partial commitments does not satisfy FCM for  , then for every , learning
is inadequate. The set of types for which learning is partial is independent of  and is
P =
n
 2 n^  :  > 0 for some 0 2 ^ 
o
.
FCM is necessary and sucient for globally adequate learning regardless of the Planner's
patience or prior. When FCM is satised, even when the decisionmaker has slight patience, his
eventual choices correspond to how he would behave were he fully sophisticated about his im-
perfect self-control. As proven in Lemma 9, eventual beliefs 1 almost-surely place probability
1 on the true  if  is not in ^ , and otherwise put probability 1 on ^ . In both cases, the eventual
commitment choice yields the same payos as those in the complete-information benchmark.
Moreover, under FCM, globally adequate learning may obtain even if the decisionmaker is not
suciently forward-looking to actively learn and experiment: a passive learner who myopically
best-responds to his beliefs eventually behaves as if he perfectly understood his temptation. As
such, the introduction of partial commitments that yield FCM can have strong implications for
individuals regardless of their patience.
14In contrast, when FCM fails, then so long as the Planner is not perfectly patient ( = 1),
learning is partial. The set of types for which learning is partial is invariant to the Planner's
patience or prior, though the probability of the failure of learning does depend on both. When
the Planner's eventual choice diverges from the full information benchmark for some  in P,
it does so in a systematic way: the Planner chooses a commitment level z that exceeds  z (),
and thereby, fully commits the type to a = 1 when partial commitment is optimal.
The characterization of P and its invariance to the discount factor and prior is an impli-
cation of Assumption 1. Failing Assumption 1, if the Planner can observe ut perfectly ex post,
then the partial learning set 
P depends on  and 0. However, the remainder of Theorem 2
holds as before: FCM remains necessary and sucient for globally adequate learning. In Section
3.4.2, I prove the analogue of Theorem 2 when ut is observed perfectly by the Planner after the
Doer's choice.
From a methodological perspective, the above result informs us that only when FCM is
satised does a steady-state analysis that assumes that the Planner is fully sophisticated have
learning-based foundations. In environments in which it is satised, this result give us greater
condence in assuming sophistication for experienced individuals. At the same time, the result
gives us cause to suspect that individuals may not be fully sophisticated in environments in
which FCM may fail, and indicates that interventions may help even experienced individuals
have a greater understanding of their temptations.
I omit a detailed description of how a failure of FCM leads to partial learning since its
essence is contained in Section 2; a general proof is in the Appendix. To illustrate how FCM
leads to globally adequate, consider Examples 1 and 2. Globally adequate learning fails only
when the Doer is induced to always choose a = 1; in only that case is the Planner unable to
identify the Doer's type from its empirical frequency. Observe that once the Planner's belief
converges to any limit, his limiting action must be a static best-response to that limiting belief
since all opportunities to learn are exhausted. Therefore, to demonstrate that globally adequate
learning obtains, it suces to demonstrate that under FCM, any limiting belief that rationalizes
a limiting commitment choice must put positive probability only on those types for which such
a choice is optimal.







. Suppose that globally adequate learning fails and that the Planner
observes that the Doer always chooses a = 1 under some commitment level z. The Planner
can then infer that  is in
1
4   2z; 1
2

. A deviation to a commitment level of z   1
8 is strictly
protable: for a positive measure of types, this deviation strictly improves payos and for all
other types, this deviation does not aect payos. Iterating this process, the Planner always
decreases commitment until the Doer chooses both actions with positive probability. Then the
Planner can eventually identify the Doer's type from the empirical frequency of its choices. In
this example, that globally adequate learning obtains may not be surprising since ^  is empty.
To that end, consider Example 2: here the Planner would wish to force every type above 1
4 to






, if the Planner nds that the Doer always chooses a = 1, he can infer that  is
in
1
4   2z; 1
2






improves the Planner's static
payos: for every type   1
4, the payos remain unchanged, and for any type lower than that,
his payos potentially improve strictly. Thus, once again, iterating the best-response involves
decreasing the level of commitment until the Planner reaches the point at which he ascribes





or to some type  less than 1
4. In either case, his limiting action
leads to identical payos as in the complete information benchmark.
The notion of FCM hinges on how dierent types in  respond to partial commitments
chosen from Z. Yet, a designer of commitments|policymaker or rm|may not know  or W
precisely. The result below demonstrates that only the full set of commitments ensures globally
adequate learning for all possible environments that satisfy the above assumptions.
Theorem 3. Learning is globally adequate for all environments   if and only if Z = [ 1;1].
3.4 Remarks
3.4.1 Identifying Awareness
The necessary and sucient condition for adequate learning, FCM, is dened in terms of how
a fully sophisticated Planner copes with the full range of possible temptations. As in the
applications in Section 4, it is relatively straightforward to check distinguishability conditions
in full-information models that we typically use; in contexts such as savings or addiction, our
model of the temptation and commitment environment inherently reveal whether FCM would
be satised. Accordingly, when specifying the full information model, a modeler often implicitly
assumes FCM or its absence.
When a modeler or policymaker does not have a particular full-information model, checking
for FCM may be challenging since how a decisionmaker copes with dierent levels of temptation
is not directly observed. Nevertheless, within some settings, an individual's long-run preference
for commitment can help identify his eventual awareness.14 I illustrate this by considering the
simple framework here, assuming that a policymaker can observe choices from the commitment
set Z. Supposing that the Planner chooses commitment as studied above, his inferred preference
ranking over commitment would lead the policymaker to conclude the following.
1. If a decisionmaker's most preferred commitment is some z 2 Z, and this commitment
is strictly preferred over every other, then the decisionmaker is partially committing and
therefore, learns adequately in the limit. However, if the decisionmaker weakly prefers
the greatest possible commitment (z = 1) over every other commitment choice, then he
is fully committing and so he may or may not be sophisticated.
14That a preference for commitment can reveal awareness is described by Gul and Pesendorfer (2005); their
setting is dierent, and their focus is not on questions of learning.
162. When the decisionmaker may or may not be sophisticated, the policymaker can learn
about the decisionmaker's awareness by exposing him to dierent commitments. If tempo-
rary subsidies to commitments not in the most preferred set have long lasting implications
on the decisionmaker's commitment choices, then learning was inadequate.15
3.4.2 Perfect Ex Post Observability
Assumption 1 plays an important role in Theorem 2: it ensures that any observation (z;a;y)
that occurs with \positive probability" when the Doer is of type  also occurs with \positive
probability" when the Doer is a dierent type 0.16 Without this common support assumption,
a single observation can lead the Planner to attribute probability 0 to certain types. In this
section, I study learning without Assumption 1: specically, I suppose after the Doer's choice,
the Planner observes ut perfectly in each period. I demonstrate that the equivalence between
FCM and globally adequate learning holds in this environment, although the characterization
of the types for which learning is partial depends on patience and the Planner's prior.
The following example highlights some of the issues involved.








and the Planner has a choice between full exibility and commitment. In the full information
benchmark, the Planner chooses to fully commit when the Doer is of type 1
5, and otherwise
chooses full exibility. Therefore, FCM fails since the Planner commits for the lowest type but
remains exible for both higher types. If costs ct were unobserved (as in Section 2), learning
would be partial for both higher types. However, when costs are ex post observable, learning may
be adequate for type  = 4
5 but not necessarily for type  = 1
2. The logic is as follows.
Suppose the Planner has a uniform prior: his one-period static payo from full exibility






, then he learns nothing about the Doer since all 3 types choose a0 = 1 in response




, all 3 types choose a0 = 0 revealing no information.





, then if he observes the Doer undertaking the activity, he learns that
 = 4











Consequently, for all of the outcomes that occur with positive probability when  = 4
5, the Planner
always chooses to remain exible. Almost-surely, he learns the Doer's type when  = 4
5. At the
same time, partial learning is still possible for  = 1
2: there exists   < 1 such that for  <  , the
Planner eventually chooses to commit with positive probability and never learns .
15Indeed, as described in Section 4.2, temporary subsidies to drug rehabilitation are often believed to have ef-
fects after the subsidy has ended (Kaper et al., 2005, 2006). Given the experimentation challenge that individuals
face in nding the appropriate therapy for their temptation, it is natural that learning is inadequate.
16Technically, any observation that is within the support of the induced distribution under type  is also within
the support of the induced distribution under type 
0. Since y draws values from a continuum, each particular
observation has probability 0.
17The example highlights the intricacies that emerge without Assumption 1. The following
weaker result emerges in this environment.
Theorem 4.
1. If the set of partial commitments satises FCM for  , then for every  > 0, learning is
globally adequate.
2. If the set of partial commitments does not satisfy FCM for  , then for every  > 0,
learning is inadequate. The set of types for which learning is partial depends on the
Planner's patience, , and the Planner's prior, 0.
The equivalence between FCM and globally adequate learning is nearly identical to that
of Theorem 2. The suciency of FCM for globally adequate learning with perfect ex post
observability follows from Theorem 2: learning strategies that are ecient when information
is coarse continue to be ecient when information is precise. The necessity of FCM however
requires a distinct and more intricate argument. Under perfect observability, a Bayesian Planner
updates his prior by truncating the support after each observation; the argument in this context
relies on the particular form that updating takes.
3.4.3 Relationship to Self-Conrming Equilibrium
The dynamic process of learning that I have studied has a natural relationship with the steady-
state solution concepts of self-conrming equilibria (SCE), developed by Fudenberg and Levine
(1993a), in which players' beliefs must be consistent with experiences only on the path of play.17
Indeed, one way to view these results may be as a foundation for studying SCE in dynamic self-
control environments.18 However, despite the close resemblance to SCE, the dynamics studied
herein are necessary to draw the distinction between FCM and its absence.
To illustrate, when FCM is satised and ^  is non-empty, there exist self-conrming equilibria
in which the Planner overcommits and partially learns: suppose that the Planner holds a belief
 that assigns probability 1 to ^  and responds to these beliefs by choosing z = 1. Such a
belief-action pair is a SCE regardless of the Doer's true type . In contrast to this SCE, when
the Planner begins with a smooth prior in the dynamic model, he almost-surely does not ascribe
probability 0 to the complement of ^  if the Doer's true type is not in ^ . This gives the Planner
17Self-conrming equilibria have been studied and developed further in Dekel et al. (1999, 2004), and applied
to a behavioral context by Esponda (2008). A summary is oered by Fudenberg and Levine (2009a).
18The appropriate analogue is a static Bayesian game between the Planner and Doer in which each has the
payo functions specied earlier, and the Planner knows how dierent types of the Doer behave. A Nash
equilibrium in this game corresponds to the Planner putting probability 1 on the true Doer type and best-
responding to it. A self-conrming equilibrium corresponds to the Planner having a possibly non-degenerate
belief  of the Doer's type, the Planner takes a best-response z, and the Planner's information feedback does
not cause him to update the belief .
18a strict incentive to choose lower commitment levels, and such choices lead to adequate learning.
As such, the limiting choices of the dynamic model renes the set of SCE.19
Moreover, while it is known that self-conrming equilibria correspond to the results of
myopic experimentation (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993b), the steady-state model does not inform
what restrictions (if any) are necessary for the Planner's patience to yield partial learning in
the absence of FCM. In contrast, the dynamic framework reveals that inadequate learning
transpires for all discount factors, and if Assumption 1 is satised, permits one to characterize
the set of types for which learning may be partial independently of the Planner's patience.
4 Applications
4.1 Consumption-Savings
Individuals are often tempted to overconsume and sometimes demand commitment to curb
this temptation; accordingly, imperfect self-control has been studied in many papers on con-
sumption and savings.20 As demonstrated by prior work, access to an illiquid asset endows
the decisionmaker with a powerful instrument for partial commitment.21 I show that such par-
tial commitments yield full learning for a decisionmaker who is uncertain about his tendency
to overconsume. In particular, applying the framework that I developed in Section 3, I show
that an analogue of FCM is automatically satised in this environment thereby allowing us to
leverage those positive results in this more complex setting.
The simple savings environment that I study is a decisionmaker who faces a tradeo be-







, where for simplicity, U is a CRRA utility function with a
coecient of relative risk aversion  > 0. The DM is uncertain about the value of consumption
in each period, represented by the i.i.d. taste shock ut, which is drawn continuously from [u;  u]
with cdf F and where 0 < u <  u and E [u] = 1. The assumption of CRRA utility allows me to
restrict attention to consumption paths that are linear in wealth.
Consumption choices are made as follows: each period is divided into two sub-periods.
Wealth at the beginning of the period is denoted by yt which can be invested by the Planner
in illiquid assets or kept in a liquid form in the rst sub-period. The Planner selects a minimal
savings rate, st, by investing an amount styt in illiquid assets. In the second sub-period, the
Doer selects consumption ct in the second sub-period that is feasible|ct  (1   st)yt|and
invests the remainder. As before, the Planner is the long-run decisionmaker whereas the Doer
is a short-run behavioral type who simply over-consumes relative to the Planner's preferences.
19The exact issue is a failure of lower hemi-continuity in the Planner's best-response z (): consider a sequence
of beliefs fng
1
n=1 that converges (in the weak topology) to 1, a measure with support ^ . Suppose further
that for each n, ^  is a strict subset of Supp(n). Then z = 1 is one of a continuum of exact best-responses for
belief 1 but is not an exact best-response for any belief n.
20Harris and Laibson (2003) survey this burgeoning literature. Closely related recent papers are Amador et al.
(2006), Brocas and Carrillo (2008), and Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2009b).
21In particular, see Laibson (1997), Laibson et al. (1998), and Amador et al. (2006).
19Formally, let c(ut) denote the Planner's optimal policy if he could contract perfectly on the
taste shock ut and had wealth 1.22 Relative to this, a Doer of type  would like to consume
c(ut) at the same wealth level, and selects the feasible consumption closest to this ideal. Doer




drawn according to 0.
I make two assumptions on the capital markets: rst, that the Planner has access to perfect
capital markets at the investment stage so the initial wealth y0 includes all of the consumer's
future income. Second, I assume that returns on savings occur at gross rate R regardless of
whether these savings were made by the Planner or Doer. Accordingly, the wealth in period
t is generated from the returns from saving in the prior period: yt = R(yt 1   ct 1). Both of
these assumptions serve to simplify the exposition but are not critical to the analysis. Finally,
to ensure that the transversality condition is satised, I assume that R1  < 1.
Since my goal is to establish the inevitability of adequate learning, I make the most stark
of informational assumptions: the Planner observes only past consumption and not past taste-
shocks. Since learning emerges here, it continues do so in less austere observational environ-
ments. Unlike the analysis of Section 3, commitment consists of specifying menus that constrain
the Doer's choice rather than aecting the Doer's payos.23 The specication of a consumption-
cap induces separating and bunching regions and aects the Planner's inferences: for choices
that are strictly below the consumption-cap, the Planner recognizes that the consumption cor-
responds to the Doer's ideal point (given the taste-shock). In contrast, when consumption
is at the cap, then the Planner recognizes that with probability 1, the cap was binding, and
therefore, the Planner has less ability to distinguish the Doer's ideal point. Since the Planner's
optimal cap depends on his beliefs and wealth, solving the model with partial awareness is a
challenging exercise.
Nevertheless, one can characterize asymptotic behavior using simply the full-information
benchmark and tools from Section 3. Lemma 12 in the Appendix demonstrates that for each
type , a fully informed Planner has a stationary solution, which consists of purchasing the
same fraction of illiquid assets, s(), in each period. This induces a consumption-cap and
bunching for high taste shocks but retains exibility for the Doer to choose lower consumption
for lower taste shocks. If the maximal consumption rate, 1   s(), is less than the Doer's
ideal consumption rate for all taste-shocks, then the consumption-cap is binding for all taste-
shocks. Solving for the the optimal binding consumption path yields that for all , s() takes
a maximum value of s = 1=R(1 )=.
Based on the optimal binding consumption path, one can then partition  into those types
for which full commitment is optimal and those types for which some exibility is retained.
Consider those types 0 that consume more than (1   s) even with the lowest possible taste-
shock u. For such a type, it is optimal to set s() to equal s, and thereby commit these
22In the Appendix, I show that c
 (u) =
u1=C









23As such, the notion of commitment also diers from that in Laibson (1997) and Barro (1999), who abstract
from the value of exibility, and consider a decisionmaker's ability to commit to a particular consumption path.
20types to consume (1   s)yt regardless of the taste-shock ut. In contrast, for a type  for
which c(u) < 1   s, the Planner purchases a smaller fraction of illiquid assets, and thereby
retains greater exibility for the Doer. Accordingly, the only types that are fully committed to
a particular consumption path are those in ^  = f 2  : c(u)  1   sg, and all other types
are oered some partial exibility. Figure 1 below illustrates these consumption-caps:  is a
type that is accorded partial exibility, whereas type 0 is accorded no exibility since 0c(u)
exceeds s.
The appropriate analogue of FCM and distinguishability are thus naturally satised in this
setting: when the Planner prefers to fully commit a type, he also prefers to fully commit all
higher types. Moreover, when the Planner sets a consumption-cap of (1   s), any type  = 2 ^ 
is bound by this consumption-cap with probability strictly less than 1, as can be seen in the
above gure. In the gure, type 0 in ^  makes choices at the consumption-cap (1   s) with
probability 1, the type  = 2 ^  chooses below that consumption cap whenever ut is less than
u. Thus, even when selecting this commitment path, the Planner can distinguish types in ^ 
(for which such full-commitment is optimal) from types not in ^  (for which the Planner retains
some exibility for the Doer). In either case, learning is adequate.
Theorem 5. Learning is globally adequate in this consumption-savings framework.
The possibility for globally adequate learning implies that eventually, the decisionmaker
sets commitment choices in a fully sophisticated manner. Thus, the assumption that decision-
makers are sophisticated about their tendency to overconsume has a strong learning-theoretic
justication. Of course, while learning, the Planner may make (ex post) inecient choices that
21adversely aect his future income distribution relative to the full information benchmark, but
biases in the Planner's beliefs eventually disappear. Partial commitments are indeed necessary
for this positive learning: if the Planner faced a choice between full exibility and full commit-
ment to consuming a particular fraction of income in each period, the possibility for persistent
biases would re-emerge.
The full information model to which behavior eventually converges shares many predictions
of sophistication in the quasi-hyperbolic savings model|such as inducing a demand for com-
mitment and the tendency to undersave relative to a normative benchmark|but is analytically
distinct. The full information model analyzed here has a unique solution and a constant com-
mitment rate with CRRA utility (similar to Fudenberg and Levine 2006, 2009b). In contrast,
the quasi-hyperbolic savings model in discrete-time has multiple sophisticated solutions (Krusell
and Smith, 2003; Harris and Laibson, 2003) and thus, learning-theoretic foundations for sophis-
tication in the quasi-hyperbolic model would have the additional challenge of justifying the
equilibrium selection.
4.2 Addiction
Several studies on addiction have highlighted how individuals respond in dierent ways to drug
use, depending on social, psychological, and genetic factors. Wagner and Anthony (2002) nd
that a mere 16% of habitual cocaine users actually become addicted during their rst 10 years,
and O'Brien and Anthony (2005) estimate that only 6% become addicted during their rst
1 2 years. In light of this substantial heterogeneity, individuals may not know how they would
respond to addictive substances, and learn about this only through experience. I explore the
possibilities for learning by building on the model of Bernheim and Rangel (2004).24
So as to save space, I relegate the formal details of this model to the Appendix and informally
describe what unfolds as the decisionmaker learns. So as to illustrate dierent mechanisms for
partial learning as transparently as possible, I make stark assumptions. Throughout, a type G
is less susceptible to addiction and a type B is more susceptible.
Example 5 (Overavoidance). Suppose that if the DM were of type G, a fully-informed DM
would leisurely consume drugs but that for type B, a fully-informed DM is easily addicted and so
is best o avoiding drugs altogether. Suppose that avoidance of cues can eliminate the possibility
for cue-conditioned consumption altogether. Then a partially aware DM may experiment with
drugs, and be triggered suciently often that he decides that he is too easily susceptible to
addiction and should perpetually avoids drugs. Such commitment may emerge even if the DM's
could leisurely consume substances.
The possibility for overavoidance corresponds closely to the overcommitment result obtained
in earlier sections. That individuals may avoid drugs when partially aware is intuitive: while
24Orphanides and Zervos (1995) and Wang (2007) also focus on learning and experimentation but in the
context of the rational addiction framework. While experimenting with drugs can induce ex post regret, long-run
learning is complete in their framework.
22there is a chance that one may not become addicted, the risks may simply be too great to
induce any experimentation. Therefore, beliefs that exaggerate these risks may persist. Consis-
tent with this case, Lander (1990) nds that even trained medical practitioners overestimate the
likelihood with which patients become addicted to pain management medication, and choose
to withhold such medication for fear of inducing addiction. Viscusi (1990) discusses how indi-
viduals overestimate the dangers of smoking.25
At the same time, partial awareness and learning can induce over-consumption of drugs:
suppose a DM is uncertain about the ecacy of rehabilitation.
Example 6 (Insucient Rehabilitation). Suppose that for type B, costly rehabilitation is
ineective insofar as he returns to a high addictive state soon thereafter with high probability,
but that for type G, rehabilitation is optimal. A partially aware DM who nds himself in state S
will only experiment with rehabilitation for nitely many periods before (incorrectly) concluding
that he becomes too easily addicted after rehabilitation to justify its expense.
That the cost of rehabilitation and therapy may prevent individuals from experimenting
suciently often to learn about its ecacy is intuitive. Consistent with this possibility, Kaper
et al. (2005, 2006) nd that subsidizing smoking cessation therapies indeed impacts long-run
abstinence even after the subsidization program ended. One reasonable interpretation is that
individual addicts are unsure about which therapy may successfully help them quit smoking
and learn this through the subsidization program.26
Similar to the challenge of insucient rehabilitation, the following highlights the challenge
of zero-tolerance beliefs, described by Baumeister et al. (1994) and others: the belief that one's
addictive tendencies will snowball becomes a self-fullling prophecy.
Example 7 (Zero-tolerance beliefs). Suppose that a decisionmaker is persuaded to (falsely)
believe that an initial lapse will cause one to have little future self-control. Then, a former addict
who avoids drugs, but experiences a single lapse believes that there is no value to avoiding drugs
in higher addictive states. Accordingly, such a DM, after a single lapse, will expose himself
in every subsequent period (although avoidance may have been optimal in a full-information
setting).
When an individual holds zero-tolerance beliefs, he anticipates a slippery slope following an
initial lapse. Thus, such an individual shows little restraint: he exposes himself to drugs and
never learns how much self-control he may have possessed had he avoided them.
25Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) discuss a dierent source for such biased beliefs: namely that a decisionmaker
may strategically choose to believe that such temptations are dangerous to induce commitment.
26In a similar vein, but in the context of tness, Charness and Gneezy (2009) nd that a temporary incentive
to exercise has strong post-intervention eects. While they interpret this in support of habit-formation, a com-
plementary explanation is that some individuals may have been suciently undercondent about their future
self-control (and future attendance) that exercise did not appear valuable in absence of incentives. However, dur-
ing the incentive period, these individuals learned that they possessed sucient self-control to exercise regularly,
and this condence in the future motivates them to exercise.
234.3 Costly Self-Control
Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2009b) oer a simple but powerful Planner-Doer framework in
which the Doer's preferences are completely characterized by the present and the Planner exerts
costly self-control so as to induce the Doer to take actions more consistent with the Planner's
preferences. Here, I analyze how a Planner who is uncertain about the cost or ecacy of self-
control learns over time how much self-control to use, building on the binary action environment
from Section 2 and Fudenberg and Levine (2006, Section 4).
Consider a decisionmaker who can completes an innite sequence of tasks. Completing a
task in any period (at = 1) leads to a future benet with a present value of b. Not completing





, generating a tradeo between commitment and exibility.
Prior to the realization of ct, the Planner chooses a non-empty menu from f 1;1g. After
the realization of the benet of leisure, the Planner can exert costly self-control if it is necessary
to inuence the Doer's choice. When the Planner exerts self-control of magnitude    0, self-
control is successful for a Doer of type  if   exceeds ct; otherwise, it fails. The Planner's
marginal payo from completing a task at date t is b     and the marginal payo from not





The full-information model, in which the Planner knows , corresponds to that considered
by Fudenberg and Levine (2006). If  is suciently low, then the Planner chooses the menu
f 1;1g and has an associated cuto c such that he exerts costly self-control ct if and only
if ct is less than c. Such a choice has the benet of exibility, since the Planner can exert
costly self-control depending on the taste-shock. In contrast, when  is suciently high, the
Planner may prefer to commit through the singleton menu; while this relinquishes exibility, it
obviates costly self-control. The critical value of  that determines whether the Planner prefers
exibility or commitment is  =
(1 b)2
2b 1 .
When the Planner is uncertain about , he may use too much or too little self-control to
inuence the Doer. Employing too little self-control leads the agent to not complete the task
while the costs of self-control are still borne. In contrast, too much self-control guarantees that
the task is completed, but at unnecessary expense. Over time, the Planner learns about the
ecacy of self-control based on the past history. As before, it is possible to assess eventual
beliefs and choices simply by studying the full-information model.
Theorem 6. If   is at most , then FCM is satised: a fully-informed Planner always chooses
a exible menu and then to exercise self-control. Thus, learning is globally adequate. In contrast,
if   exceeds , then FCM is violated: a fully-informed Planner may choose to commit for
suciently high values of  but would prefer exibility for lower values of . Thus, learning is
inadequate.
The above result highlights when a decisionmaker learns to use self-control and commitment
appropriately. When exibility and self-control are always preferable to commitment, learning
24is fully ecient, whereas when commitment may be preferable, then long-run ineciencies may
persist in the limit.
5 Discussion
This paper oers a simple and tractable non-equilibrium approach to study how beliefs, self-
control, and commitment choices jointly evolve. I derive a condition on full information settings
that can reveal exactly when sophistication has strong learning-based foundations. When FCM
is satised, even a passive learner eventually makes choices as if he were in the full-information
benchmark. As such, learning-based foundations for sophistication in these settings, such as
a savings environment, can help address the criticism that it involves an unrealistic level of
rationality.27 In contrast, when FCM fails, then learning fails for a decisionmaker who is not
perfectly patient. In these settings, an assumption of sophistication precludes certain behavioral
predictions and policy interventions can facilitate greater awareness.
Generating a non-equilibrium approach to study evolving self-awareness requires the choice
of a modeling framework, and there is little reason at this stage to think that the approach here
is the best possible way to do so. Nevertheless, it provides a useful starting point to study a
number of dierent canonical applications and emerge with some general insights. One aspect
of a dual-selves environment that makes it particularly attractive for such a purpose is that
such models are analytically simple and generally have unique solutions when a decisionmaker
is sophisticated, as emphasized in prior work. Accordingly, the task of checking whether the
unique solution under partial awareness converges to the unique solution under sophistication
is straightforward. In contrast, intrapersonal games even under exogenous beliefs often have
multiple solutions and are challenging to solve. These diculties are exacerbated by the intro-
duction of partial awareness and learning since these inevitably raise questions of self-signaling
in an intrapersonal game.
When learning fails at the limit, I nd that it occurs in a particular direction, namely that
individuals underestimate their self-control. It is important to understand the extent to which
these results can be reconciled with evidence from the eld. Measuring self-awareness is dicult,
not least because individual choices are driven by many features|limited memory or attention,
signaling considerations, temptations in the choice of menu|absent in standard self-control
models (including this one). Some of the evidence on self-awareness comes from individuals'
contractual choices and their subsequent decisionmaking. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006)
demonstrate that many individuals choose monthly gym memberships but given their usage of
27Rubinstein (2005) oers such a criticism:
\Sophistication is unrealistic since it suers from the problems of subgame perfection. An
agent is super-rational in the sense that he perfectly anticipates his future selves and arrives at
equilibrium between them. Present-bias is a realistic phenomenon, but the combination of the ;
preferences with naivete or sophistication assumptions makes the model even more unrealistic than
time consistency models."
25the gym, would have paid less per visit had they selected the pay-per-visit option. Similarly,
Shui and Ausubel (2004) nd that individuals accept introductory credit card oers with lower
interest rates for a shorter duration rather than a higher interest rate with a longer duration
though they may be better o with the latter choice. In both cases, behavior is consistent
with individuals being sophisticated about their self-control|valuing the commitment oered
by a monthly membership or a shorter duration period|as well as them overestimating their
self-control. In a model with overlapping generations, it is quite likely that both eects are
present insofar as less experienced customers who have not had opportunities to learn may
overestimate self-control. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) argue that delays in cancelling
contracts are more consistent with partial naivete. However, even when a decisionmaker does
not overestimate self-control, he has an incentive to delay canceling since there is an \option
value" from learning, particularly for the rst-time customers that comprise this sample. Such
individuals may be learning both about their self-control and the costs and benets of going to
a health club (as also argued by Fudenberg and Levine 2006).
Indeed, in such a setting, one can show that learning about self-control can be particularly
slow and cause someone to undercommit for a long period of time. To highlight this mechanism
simply, consider the two-type model from Section 2, and suppose for simplicity that  = 0.
Instead of the distribution of costs being known by the Planner, suppose that it depends on the
realization of a random variable ; in particular, let ct be distributed uniformly with support
[;1 + ], and suppose that  itself is 0 with probability 1 0 and
     

b with probability 0.
This particular support is made for simplifying reasons and is unnecessary for the analysis.28
Over time, it would be natural for the Planner to learn about the disutility of taking the
action, but to make the point transparently, suppose that information about past costs does
not emerge for a long time. Within this context, a Planner who observes the Doer choose a = 1
with frequency b cannot distinguish his lack of self-control from a strong disutility of taking the
action. Prior beliefs then determines his choice to remain exible or commit (in the long-run
limit), and under certain conditions, such a Planner may perpetually undercommit relative to
a full information benchmark.
Proposition 2. If 0 and 0 are suciently high, and (;0) is the realized state, then a partially
aware Planner always chooses exibility. If, however, a sophisticated Planner knew that  = 0
or that  = , then almost-surely, the Planner would choose to commit.
The assumption that a Planner never observes any ex post information about payos is
critical:29 when the Planner obtains informative signals about payos, this sequence of signals
identify  in the long-run limit, eliminating the possibility for undercommitment. Such an
informational restriction is implausible in the long-run but is likely to be true in the short
and medium run. As such, in a health-club setting, the framework here predicts that results
28Identical results hold if  varies along a continuum and has values in its support that are
     

b apart.
29As such, the issue is similar to the cases studied by Dekel et al. (2004) and Esponda (2008) in which payos
are not observed, and to the identication challenges in Acemoglu et al. (2009).
26consistent with overestimating self-control should persist over a long horizon when the Planner
learns about the utility or disutility of actions slowly.
Finally, the nature of long-run beliefs does not imply that a decisionmaker should never
undercommit. Commitment often has costs apart from nancial or its loss of exibility; in
many contexts, such as addiction, the choice to commit is observable, and so a decisionmaker
who recognizes his imperfect self-control may nevertheless choose not to commit so as to hide it
from others. Moreover, to the extent that commitment requires self-control (as argued by Noor
2007), even a fully sophisticated decisionmaker may not commit. If a decisionmaker is tempted
by choice of menu, his behavior may appear rationalized by partial naivete even when he has
a perfect understanding of his self-control. As such, extensions to this framework to allow for
these considerations arise can explain why individuals may not commit to the extent that they
should, even when they learn about their temptations over time.
In spite of all the potential reasons for people not to commit, many recent studies highlight
the demand for commitment that individuals exhibit, as surveyed in DellaVigna (2009). Consis-
tent with a demand for commitment, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998), Human and Barenstein
(2005), and Cadena and Keys (2008) nd that individuals are averse to debt, even when the
debt is interest-free. Baumeister et al. (1994) interpret obsessions, compulsions, and rigidity
as a response to beliefs that one lacks control otherwise. Such a demand for commitment is
consistent with both sophistication and underestimating self-control.
I have focused on only one channel for uncertainty to interact with commitment choices,
namely that of costly experimentation. Naturally, my work builds on the rich literature in
experimentation|especially Rothschild (1974), Easley and Kiefer (1988), and Aghion et al.
(1991)|although to my knowledge, the relationship between FCM and adequate learning de-
rived here is unique to this setting. Prior work on self-control and learning has studied issues
that arise when information aect one's temptation;30 such issues are complementary to my
analysis since information helps the Planner make commitment choices but has no other eect
on the Doer's actions. I view this paper as a starting point to understand how an individual
learns how to exert self-control, and there are many directions for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Section 2
I defer the proof of Proposition 1 to the Supplementary Appendix because it follows standard
techniques.
30For example, Benabou and Tirole (2004) examine the possibility for a self-reputation mechanism to induce
internal commitment and overregulation, in which temptation is mitigated by the adverse reputational eect it
induces in future incarnations. That partial awareness can induce overregulation is a common feature of both
our models. Bodner and Prelec (2003) and Dal Bo and Tervio (2008) also consider self-signaling games in which
an individual cares intrinsically about the type of person that she is, and thereby chooses actions that signal her
goodness and hide her true type. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) explores how a decisionmaker may decide to stop
learning, even when it is costless, so as to mitigate future commitment problems.
27Proof of Theorem 1 on p. 8









by t. Let  =

1 . Consider the case where  = . Observe that hti
is a super-martingale:
Et [t+1j = ] =
(
t if  > 0
 
1    b

t if  = 0
By Doob's Supermartingale Convergence Theorem for non-negative random variables (Billings-
ley, 1995, p. 468-469), there exists a non-negative random variable 1 with support [0;1) such
that t !a:s: 1.
Lemma 1. Supp(1)  [0;)
Proof. Suppose that for some xed x 2 (;1) that x 2 Supp(1). Consider the ball B" (x) =












. Since x is in the support of
1, then i is eventually in B" (x) with positive probability. Observe that for all ~ x 2 B" (x),
when i = ~ x, the Planner chooses z = 0 since ~ x > . The Planner then observes either











if  6= 0 and i+1 =
 
1    b

~ x if  = 0; neither value is in B" (x). Therefore,
i 2 B" (x) ) i+1 = 2 B" (x); thus, x = 2 Supp(1), leading to a contradiction.
To prove  = 2 Supp(1): suppose the opposite. It must be that for all ", i is eventually in












, and consider the
set B = [; + "]. Observe that along any sample-path, if i < , then for every k > i,
k = i < . Consequently, the only sample-paths along which hii converges to  are those
in which i   for every i, and limi!1 i = . For ~ x in B, if i = ~ x, the Planner must












, neither of which is in
B. Q.E.D.
The above establishes that Pr(limt!1 t 2 [0;)j = ) = 1. Since the Planner chooses












 . Consider the case where  =   and observe that hti is a martingale. By the
Martingale Convergence Theorem, there exists a random variable 1 with Supp(1)  [0;1)
such that t !a:s: 1.
Lemma 2. Supp(1)  f0g [ (;1)
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
The above Lemma establishes that conditional on  =  , 1 2 f1g [ [0;) with prob-














> 0. To see that Pr
 
limt!1 zt = 0j =  

> 0: observe that since
hti is a martingale, E [t] = 0   for every t where the inequality follows from 0  .
By Fatou's Lemma, E [1]  limt!1 E [t]  , and as (0;] \ Supp(1) is non-empty,
Pr(1 = 0) > 0. Therefore Pr
 




Some Preliminaries: Before proceeding to the theorems in the text, I highlight some proper-
ties of the complete-information solution. Recall that  () = maxz2Z  (;z) and z () is the
smallest maximizer of  (;z). Let u(;z) be the lowest value in U;z = fu 2 U : W (u;;z)  0g.
For a set A  , let inf (A) and sup(A) denote the inmum and supremum of the set A.
Lemma 3. If  < 0, then z ()  z (0).
Proof. Suppose, towards contradiction, that z = z () < z (0) = z0. Observe that  (0;z0)  
 (0;z) =
R u(0;z)
u(0;z0) udF > 0 implies that u(0;z) > 0. Observe that u(;z)  u(0;z) and
u(;z0)  u(0;z0). Accordingly,  (;z0)    (;z)  0. If  (;z0) =  (;z), then it must be
that u(;z) = u(;z0) 2 fu;  ug. If u(;z) =  u, then  (;z) = 0 < E [u] =  (;1) contradicting
the assumption that z 6= z (). If u(;z) = u, then by monotonicity of W, u(0;z) = u < 0
leading to a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that  (;z0) >  (;z) contradicting the
supposition that z = z ().31 Q.E.D.
Lemma 4. Consider a convergent decreasing sequence fng
1
n=1 such that n 2 ^  for each n.
Then limn!1 n 2 ^ .
Proof. Let 1 = limn!1 n. By continuity of  and since Z is closed, limn!1  z (n) exists
and  z (1) = limn!1  z (n). Lemma 3 establishes that because 1  n for each n, z (1) 
z (n). Recognizing that z (n) =  z (n), and taking limits yields z (1)  limn!1  z (n) =
 z (1). Therefore, 1 2 ^ . Q.E.D.
For the solution when the Planner is partially informed, I draw on techniques and results
from Easley and Kiefer (1988). An application of their Theorems 1-3 establish the existence
and uniqueness of the value function, V (;), and that the correspondence of maximizers is
u.h.c. Let z () be the selection of the minimum of the maximizers from this correspondence.
For each (u;z) in UZ, let u;z = f 2  : W (u;;z)  0g. Because the argument is standard,
the proof for the following lemma is relegated to the Supplementary Appendix.
Lemma 5. Beliefs satisfy the martingale property: for A, a Borel subset of , E [t+1 (A)jt] =
t (A).
Accordingly, the Martingale Convergence Theorem applies, and there is a P ()-valued
random variable 1 such that t !a:s: 1. I describe possible limit-beliefs in the support of
31I note that since  (;z) does not satisfy the single-crossing property in (; z), a direct proof is necessary.
291. Suppose that ^ 1 is a limit-belief on a sample-path for which beliefs converge, and for this




^ z1 = fz 2 Z : for all " > 0, T < 1, jz (^ t)   zj  " for some t  Tg;
since the correspondence of maximizers is u.h.c., ^ z1 exists.
Lemma 6. For all ;0 2 Supp(^ 1), u(;z) = u(0;z) for all z in ^ z1.
Proof. For ^ 1 to be a limit belief, it must be that the distribution of posteriors, Q(^ 1;z),
puts probability 1 on ^ 1 for all z in ^ z1; otherwise, ^ 1 almost-surely could not be the limit of
^ t when commitment choices arbitrarily close to z are selected innitely often. Suppose that
for some z in ^ z1, u(;z) < u(0;z). Then there exists  < 1 and open sets O" () and O" (0)
such that for all t in O" () and t0 in O" (0),
F(u(t;z))
F(u(t0;z)) < . By Bayes rule, it must be that
^ 1 (O" ())
^ 1 (O" (0))
=
R
O"() F (u(t;z))d^ 1 (t)
R




^ 1 (O" ())







^ 1 (O" ())
^ 1 (O" (0))

,
which is a contradiction since
^ 1(O"())
^ 1(O"(0)) > 0. Q.E.D.
Let @ denote the Dirac measure that places probability 1 on type .
Lemma 7. For  2 Supp(^ 1), and z 2 ^ z1, u(;z) = 2 fu;  ug implies that ^ 1 = @. If distinct
 and 0 are both in Supp(^ u1), then u(;z) = u(0;z) = u.
Proof. Since W is strictly monotone in its arguments, u(;z) = 2 fu;  ug implies that u(;z) 6=
u(0;z) for all 0 6= . Therefore, by Lemma 6, ^ 1 = @. If  and 0 6=  are both in Supp(^ 1),
then u(;z) 2 fu;  ug; since it is not optimal for the Planner to commit to not undertaking the
action (u(;z) =  u), the only possibility is that u(;z) = u. Q.E.D.
Recall that m(;z) =
R
  (;z)d; let m () = maxz2Z m(;z). As is standard in ex-
perimentation contexts, the dynamically optimal commitment choice in response to some limit
belief ^ 1 must attain the maximal stage payo m (^ 1) since at the limiting belief, the Plan-
ner is no longer learning and all option value is exhausted. By Lemma 4 of Easley and Kiefer
(1988), the following holds.
Lemma 8. z 2 ^ z1 implies that m(^ 1;z) = m (^ 1).
30Proof of Theorem 2 on p. 14
I begin by proving that learning is globally adequate if Z satises FCM. Suppose that ^ 








as ~ z, and
observe that since W is monotonic in , ~ z   z () for all  > ~ . Therefore,  (; ~ z) =  () for
all  in ^ , and thus, m(; ~ z) = m () for all  with support ^ . Lemma 3 establishes that for
 < ~ , z ()  ~ z, and  = 2 ^  implies that  z () > z ()  ~ z.
Lemma 9. Supp(1) 
n
^ 1 2 P () : Supp(^ 1)  ^  or ^ 1 = @ for some  = 2 ^ 
o
.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a limit belief ^ 1 in the support of
1 that is not an element of the RHS. Lemma 7 implies that for all z 2 ^ z1, u(;z) = u for
all  in Supp(^ 1). Since Supp(^ 1) includes  < ~ , it must be that for all z 2 ^ z1, z > ~ z. Let
  = inf (Supp(^ 1)), and  z = z   

. Observe that
m(^ 1;  z)   m(^ 1;z) =
Z





( (;  z)    (;z))d^ 1.
Observe that for  2 Supp(^ 1) \ nu;~ z,  z 2 [z ();  z ()), and accordingly  (;  z) >
 (;  z ()) =  (;z). Since   2 nu; z, all sets of the form B" =
 ;   + "

are of strictly





leading to the conclusion that m(^ 1;  z) > m(^ 1;z) contradicting Lemma 8. Q.E.D.
That payos converge to the complete information benchmark follows from Lemma 9. If
 2 ^ , then almost-surely, Supp(^ 1)  ^ . Therefore, ^ z1  ~ z, and so V (t;) !a:s:  ().
If  = 2 ^ , then almost-surely, ^ 1 = @, and therefore V (t;) !a:s  (). The argument for
^  = ; follows immediately.




; Lemma 4 estab-
lishes that ~  2 ^ . For any , let z () = maxfz 2 Z : z <  z ()g. For any  in ^ , Z must have a
discontinuity at  z (), otherwise the fully informed Planner would set z () <  z (). Therefore,




. By continuity of  (;z) in , there exists






> " for all  in
h
~ ; ~  + "0
i
.
Lemma 10. For each  > 0, there exists  > 0 such that z () = ~ z for all  with 
h
~ ; ~  + "0
i
>
1    .




, the dierence in expected static payos between commitment choices
z and ~ z is
m(; ~ z)   m(;z) =
Z
u;~ znu;z
( (t; ~ z)    (t;z))d
> "
h






~ ; ~  + "0
i
(E [uju  0]).
31Each commitment choice leads to a probability distribution over future beliefs. Since the
Planner can always fully commit, the following holds:
Z
P()




Also, since an alternative commitment z can at best lead to full-information payos in one
period, and because z () = ~ z for  2
h












~ ; ~  + "0
i




~ ; ~  + "0
i
.
Combining the above inequalities, the payo dierence between choosing commitment ~ z and
z is
m(; ~ z) + 
Z
P()















~ ; ~  + "0
i
1   
(E [uju  0]   E [u]).
Since ", E [u], and E [uju  0] are constants, there exists  such that 
h
~ ; ~  + "0
i
> 1 
ensures that the above inequality is positive. Thus, for any such belief , z () = ~ z. Q.E.D.
Suppose that 0 2
h
~ ; ~  + "0
i
: by the Martingale Convergence Theorem, beliefs eventually
converge. There are two possibilities for belief convergence:
(a) There exists T such that for all t > T, t
h
~ ; ~  + "0
i
< 1   , but z (t)  ~ z.
(b) There exists T such that T
h
~ ; ~  + "0
i
> 1 . By Lemma 10, z (T) = ~ z, and therefore,
for all t > T, t
h
~ ; ~  + "0
i
> 1   . Thus, for all t > T, z (t) = ~ z.
In either case, with probability 1, there exists T such that for all t  T, z (t)  ~ z. Let
HT
0 denote the set of sample-paths in which z (t)  ~ z for all t > T, and let H0 = [THT
0. By




n^ , and therefore, by monotonicity of W,
P is a subset of u;~ z. By Assumption 1, Pr(H0j) > 0 for all  2 P, and therefore, with
positive probability, the Planner chooses commitment levels of ~ z > z () for  in P.
Suppose that  = 2 P [ ^ : then  < ~ . An argument analogous to Lemma 9 establishes that
learning is adequate for such a type.
Proof of Theorem 3 on p. 16
Suppose Z = [ 1;1]. Because W is continuous in each argument, the Intermediate Value
Theorem implies that for each , there exists z such that u(;z) = 0. Thus, the Planner
can align the Doer's preferences perfectly, and accordingly ^  = ;. Therefore, by Theorem 2,
globally adequate learning obtains.
32Now suppose that Z 6= [ 1;1]; since Z is closed, there exists " > 0 and z0;z00 2 Z such
that (z00;z0) \ Z = ;. Consider  = U = [ 0:5;0:5], and let W (u;;z) = u +  + z z00
z0 z00. Since
W (u;;z)  0 for all (u;) when z  z0, any commitment level that exceeds z0 constitutes
full commitment for all types. Since W (u;;z00) = u + , the optimal commitment choice for
type 0 is z00 but for types suciently close to  0:5, the optimal choice is z0 that yields full
commitment. Therefore, FCM is not satised.
Proof of Theorem 4 on p. 18
If Z satises FCM, then globally adequate learning follows from Theorem 2. Suppose that
Z does not satisfy FCM. For each  and 0 > , let 0be the truncated measure of types on








, and recall that

















, z () =  z () = ~ z, and for  > ,




. By continuity, there exists " > 0 such that [; + ")  n^ . Consider




 1   .
A straightforward adaptation of Lemma 10 yields that for each  > 0, there exists   such that





























> 0, the result
follows.
A.3 Section 4.1
I rst describe basic properties of the savings problem that prove useful in later analysis. Let
U (c) = c1  1
1  . Consider a recursive formulation of the problem in the absence of self-control
problems:








Restricting attention to a linear consumption path, let c(u)y denote the optimal policy














where C is the unique solution to E
h 
Cu1= + 1=R(1 )=i
= 1 satises the above equa-
32I.e., for a Borel set A, 0 (A) =
R 0
 1t2Ad0.
33tion.33 Also consider the solution to the optimization problem when the Planner is restricted
to having no exibility:









[U (c)dF + V  (R(y   c))];
where the equality follows from E [u] = 1. A guess and verify approach yields that the
optimal policy is a consumption rate ~ c = 1   1=R(1 )=.
Lemma 11. ~ c 2 (c(u);c( u)) for all y.
Proof. If c(u) > ~ c, then by calculation,
Cu1=





Since the term on the LHS is increasing in u, taking expectations contradicts the denition of
C. A similar argument establishes that c( u) > ~ c. Q.E.D.
Now consider the full-information benchmark in which the Planner has beliefs @. For any
 c, let ~ u(; c;y) denote the bunching point:
~ u(; c;y) =
(
maxfu 2 U:c(u;y)   cg if c(u;y)   c
u otherwise.
The dynamic program that a fully informed Planner faces is
















Lemma 12. For each Doer type , there exists an optimal bunching point ~ u() independent of
y. Moreover, ~ u() is non-increasing in .
Proof. Suppose that ~ u(; c;y) 2 (u;  u) for some y: then the optimization problem can be
rewritten as selecting some ~ u(;y) and with  c = yc(~ u()). Applying Leibniz's Rule, the rst














33By monotonicity, uniqueness is guaranteed, and R
1  < 1 ensures existence.
34By the Envelope Theorem,













Accordingly, ~ u(;y) is determined by an equation independent of y:


















Similarly, by above, if ~ u(; c;y) = u for some y, then the equality in Equation 5 should be
replaced by , which then implies that ~ u(;y) = u for all  > 0. If ~ u(; c;y) =  u, then the
Planner is according the Doer with full exibility, and therefore, it suces to set  c () = c ( u).
Since the marginal gain from increasing ~ u is decreasing in , it follows by Topkis Theorem that
~ u() is non-increasing in : Q.E.D.
As in Section 3, denote the set of types for which the Planner wishes to fully commit as
^  = f 2  : ~ u() = ug. Since the RHS of Equation 5 is strictly increasing in , if  2 ^ , then













which implies that c(u) = ~ c: the optimal commitment path is the solution to Equation 4.
If   > ~ c
c(u), then observe that for  = ~ c







Proof of Theorem 5 on p. 21
By the Martingale Convergence Theorem, there exists a random variable 1 such that
t !a:s: 1. Suppose that complete learning does not obtain: consider ^ 1 2 Supp(1) in
which there exists  and 0 <  in the support of ^ 1. For both types to be in the support, a
generalization of Lemma 6 establishes that the two types must yield the same distribution over
consumption paths given commitment choices in the limit. Therefore, along such a sample-
path, the limiting upper-bound on consumption rate,  c1, must be weakly less than c (u)
for all  2 Supp(^ 1). By the reasoning above,  c1 = (1   ), and therefore Supp(^ 1)  ^ .
Accordingly, the only possibility for incomplete learning is when  2 ^ ; if  = 2 ^ , then almost-
surely, the Planner identies the Doer's type.
A.4 Section 4.2
Consider an individual who faces a binary choice of substance consumption in each period
(x 2 f0;1g), and has an addictive state s in f0;1;:::;Sg that summarizes past consumption.
Use in a particular state leads to a transition to the next highest state (unless s = S) whereas
no use leads to a transition to the next lowest state (unless s = 1 or s = 0 in which case the
35state remains unchanged). In each period, the DM, while in the cold mode, chooses an activity
a in fR;A;Eg. Activity E exposes the DM to a high level of substance-related cues, activity
A avoids many of these cues, and activity R is forced rehabilitation that makes consumption
infeasible. The activity choice and the prior addictive state triggers the risk of entering the
hot mode in which the DM always consumes drugs. The probability with which this happens
depends on the individual's characteristics and his ability to resist strong cravings. Denote
the individual's characteristics by  drawn from fG;Bg where G is less than B and denote
the probability that the DM enters the hot mode by p(s;a;) (where p is increasing in each
argument). For choices A and E, consumption of the drug yields a stage payo of ws (x;a),
which can be negative or positive, reecting the potential benets or costs of drug consumption
evaluated from the DM's perspective when in the cold mode. I assume that ws (x;E) exceeds
ws (x;A) for all s, reecting that avoidance is intrinsically cost. Selecting the activity R yields a
stage payo of  P, the cost of rehabilitation. The DM trades o present versus future benets
using a discount factor  < 1.
A.5 Section 4.3
Proof of Theorem 6 on p. 24
Suppose that the cost of self-control is given by . The value from exibility is
Maxc [Pr(c  c)(b   E [cjc  c]) + Pr(c > c)(E [cjc > c])]:
Solving for the rst-order condition under the distributional assumptions yields c = b
1+,






. In contrast, the value from commitment is simply b, and therefore,









which reduces to    =
(1 b)2
2b 1 .
Suppose that    : then the set of types for which the Planner chooses to fully commit
is empty. Accordingly, an analogue of Theorem 4 applies, yielding globally adequate learning.
In contrast, when   > , then the Planner prefers to fully commit for  > , but remain
exible for   . Distinguishability is violated because once the Planner chooses to fully
commit, he cannot observe the ecacy of self-control, and so analogous to Theorem 4, learning
is inadequate.
A.6 Section 5
Proof of Proposition 2 on p. 26











, and therefore, if 0 and 0 are
suciently high, the condition is satised.
To trace out how this condition implies undercommitment: it can be shown through calcula-
















, only in the case
where (;0) is realized would a fully informed Planner (who knows (;)) choose to commit.
Suppose that this is the realized state of the world. Along any history hi in which the Planner
has been exible so far, the ratio of posteriors satises:
Pr
  ;






(1   0)(1   0)
, (6)
because the state-dependent action probabilities are identical. Consider a sample-path in
which the Planner has been exible at all stages up to this point (I later return to verify that
this is optimal). By the Strong Law of Large Numbers, almost-surely, the limiting frequency











. Let ~  be the Planner's posterior belief that (;) =
  ;










     

b < ~ b
 
b  
      

b +  b
2
!!






which simplies into ~  >
2b 1 b
2b(  ). Observe that since ~  =
00
00+(1 0)(1 0), the Planner
prefers exibility to commitment at the limit of such a sample-path. It is straightforward to
prove that the Planner would also remain exible at every time period: in every nite period,
the Planner ascribes the ratio of posteriors as in Equation 6 and positive probability to the two
other states in which he strictly prefers to remain exible. Therefore, a partially naive Planner
always undercommits relative to the full information benchmark whenever (;0) is the realized
state.
Now suppose that the Planner is informed that  = 0; this coincides with Section 2 and so
the results of Theorem 1 apply. If the Planner is instead informed that  = 0, then along any
sample-path in which he remains exible, his beliefs converge to putting probability 1 on  = 0,
and therefore, again, such a Planner chooses to commit.
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41B Supplementary Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 on p. 8
I rst establish that V exists, satises Equation 1, is continuous and non-decreasing in .
Dene the function V t () recursively as follows:
V 0 () = 0
V t () = max
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
V t 1 ()
b   1







2 + V t 1 (+)



















> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
where + and   are the posteriors conditional on observing (zt;at) = (0;1) and (zt;at) =








2 + V t 1 (+)


















I verify that V t satises continuity and non-increasing. I then dene V as the point-wise limit
of V t but show that convergence is uniform. This veries the existence of V , and that V inherits
continuity and monotonicity from V t.
Lemma 13. For each t  0, V t () is continuous and non-decreasing in .
Proof. Continuity clearly holds for t = 0. By induction, if continuity holds for t  , then it
must hold for  +1 since V +1 is the upper-envelope of sums of continuous functions. Observe
that V 0 () is non-decreasing in . By induction, if V t () is nondecreasing for all t  , observe
that V +1 () is the upper-envelope of functions that are non-decreasing in , and therefore is
also non-decreasing in . Q.E.D.
Lemma 14. For all  2 [0;1], V t () is non-decreasing in t.
Proof. Observe that V t () 6= V t 1 () for any , t. Note that V 1 () > 0 = V 0 () for all
 2 [0;1]. Let V t ()  V t 1 () for all  2 [0;1], and t  . Then b   1
2 + V  () 
b   1
2 + V  1 (), and W+1 ()  W (). Therefore, V +1 ()  V  (). Q.E.D.
Given that V t () is non-decreasing in t, and V t () is uniformly bounded above by b
1 ,
by the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, there exists a point-wise limit V () = limt!1 V t (). In
fact, since V t ()  V ()  V t ()+t b
1 , for every ,
 V ()   V t ()
   t b
1 . Consequently,
the convergence is uniform leading to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. V () satises Equation 1, and is continuous and non-decreasing in .




















1  = V (1) = W (1). Also observe that if V () > W (), then for all
~  < , V (~ ) = V () > W ()  W (~ ), since it can be shown that W is non-decreasing in
. Therefore, the set, f 2 [0;1] : V () > W ()g is an interval. By continuity of V and W,
 = supf 2 [0;1] : V () > W ()g = minf 2 [0;1] : V () = W ()g.












B (1;y;z)(A)d ~ F (yju;1) + 1UnU;z
Z
Y
B (0;y;z)(A)d ~ F (yju;0)

dFdt
where B (a;y;z)(A) is the posterior belief that  2 A   given observed action a, signal
y, and commitment choice z. Denote U;z by ~ U1
;z, and UnU;z by ~ U0



















A \ ~ a
u;z

















































A \ ~ a
u0;z








d ~ F (yju0;a)dF











A \ ~ a
u0;z




























A \ ~ a
u;z











Hence, E [t+1 (A)jt] =
R
U t (A \ u;z)dF +
R
U t (Anu;z)dF = t (A).
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